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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is now recovering from the most severe 
economic meltdown since the Great Depression.1  This meltdown 
was caused by the record number of defaults on mortgage loans 
and the foreclosures that followed;2 the catalyst being the financial 
risks taken by the mortgage industry to capitalize on the rapid 
increase in property values experienced earlier this decade.3  
Eventually, the risks became too great and borrowers began 
defaulting.4  Property values quickly decreased, and with the 
decrease came an even bigger wave of foreclosures.5 
In the movie It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey stopped a run 
on the Bailey Brothers Building & Loan Association by offering his 
explanation of mortgage finance: 
You’re thinking of this place all wrong.  As if I had the 
money back in a safe.  The money’s not here . . . your 
money is in Joe’s house, right next to yours . . . and in the 
Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin’s house, and a hundred 
others.  Why, you’re lending them the money to build, 
and they’re going to pay it back to you as best they can.6 
Although most people are unaware, nearly everyone who maintains 
a savings account is also in the business of lending money to the 
mortgage industry.7  With that said, we’ve come a long way since 
 
 1. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 396 (2009) (noting that, in 
2009, the United States was “in the midst of a severe economic meltdown” with 
government bailout efforts surpassed only by the Great Depression). 
 2. See id. at 396, 413; Kenneth R. Harvey, The Lowdown on Low-Doc Loans, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/24/AR2006112400503.html (noting the significant 
risk lenders were undertaking by issuing more high-interest low-documentation 
and no-documentation home loans). 
 3. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 396.  Once home prices start to rise, the 
market builds the expectation that the increase is the norm and this expectation, 
in turn, increases the demand for houses.  Id.  See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 2. 
 4. See Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the 
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1009–10 (2009). 
 5. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414; Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From 
Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802791281.html. 
 6. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946) (quoting James Stewart‘s 
character, George Bailey). 
 7. See Lee Ann Obringer, How Banks Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/banking/bank4.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
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the days of George Bailey.8  To keep pace with the demands of 
modern banking, over the years the mortgage industry has made a 
number of business innovations, including some significant 
changes to the land records.9  This has allowed a mortgage debt to 
be purchased from loan originators, like the Bailey Brothers 
Building & Loan, and sold to large investment firms where each 
mortgage may be bundled together with hundreds of other 
mortgages and resold in fractionalized shares to private investors.10  
In George Bailey’s era, each time a mortgage was sold to another 
bank or financial institution, the new owner would record a 
mortgage assignment in the county land records.11 
Today, because of the complexity of the transfers, many of 
these assignments are now recorded electronically.12  Looking at 
the security instrument in the county recorder’s office, you are 
likely to find the name “Mortgage Electronic Recordation Systems” 
listed as the mortgagee of record—a stand-in for the real owner of 
the debt.13  Although this innovative business technique has saved 
millions of dollars since its inception,14 it also represents a 
departure from the long-standing traditions of property law.15 
This departure was the focal point in Jackson v. Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,16 where the Minnesota Supreme 
Court interpreted the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.17  The 
 
 8. See Edward Rothstein, What Would George Bailey Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/arts/television
/04conn.html. 
 9. See Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 812 (1995). 
 10. See R. K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 
1997, at 32, 34. 
 11. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 810–11. 
 12. Steve Cocheo, Moving From Paper to Blips, 88 A.B.A. BANKING J., January 
1996, at 48, 48 (1996). 
 13. Steve Brandt, Lawsuit Seeks to Block Some Foreclosures, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/west
/14444016.html (noting that in Hennepin County, MERS is listed as the 
mortgagee of record on at least half of all new mortgage filings). 
 14. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 812–13; Arnold, supra note 
10, at 35. 
 15. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.27 
(5th ed. 2007); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. 2006) 
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part). 
 16. 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009). 
 17. The foreclosure by advertisement statutes interpreted by the court in 
Jackson are essentially unchanged from the versions enacted over 160 years ago.  Id. 
at 494 (“The requirements of the statutes have changed very little over the past 
160 years.”). 
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court found that although electronic recordation may not have 
been contemplated when common law principles were established, 
this innovation is in accord with the plain language of the statutes.18  
Had the court reached the opposite conclusion, the borrowers in 
default may have benefited from the delay, but such a decision 
would have come at a high price to the public.19 
This note first examines a brief history of the mortgage 
industry and foreclosures in Minnesota.20  It then details the 
supreme court’s holding in Jackson,21 followed by an analysis of that 
decision.22  Finally, this note concludes that the court’s 
determination that the defendant’s innovation complies with the 
long-standing traditions in Minnesota property law is a sound 
approach that favors the public’s best interest.23 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Current Mortgage Crisis 
In the early part of this decade, the United States experienced 
an unprecedented appreciation in property values.24  On average, 
between 1997 and 2005, national home values increased by over 
fifty-five percent.25  However, these gains were not evenly 
distributed and resulted in unaffordable housing for many buyers.26  
 
 18. Id. at 500–501. 
 19. See infra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 399. 
 25. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, EXOTIC OR TOXIC?  AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND 
LENDERS, CONSUMER FED’N AM., 28 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org
/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0
506.pdf.  Further, “[i]n 2005, the number of home sales hit a fifth consecutive 
record year and home price appreciation was steady across the country, with many 
metropolitan areas having annual price increases above 10 percent.”  Id. at 28.  See 
also S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for Seasonally Adjusted U.S. National Values, 
STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.standardandpoors.com
/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us 
(follow the hyperlink at the “U.S. Home Price Values/Seasonally Adjusted” 
intersection).  The index shows an increase in home values on par with inflation 
until 1998 when, over the course of a year, values began to grow rapidly reaching a 
value increase of over fifteen percent by 2005.  Id.  By early 2006, values had 
peaked and rapidly plummeted in the following quarters.  Id. 
 26. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 400.  Specifically, this included many first-time 
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Mortgage companies responded by offering nontraditional loans to 
make housing more affordable.27  As a result, many consumers 
believed they could afford previously unaffordable property.28 
The extended duration of the housing boom further fueled 
the consumption of home buyers.29  With the expectation that value 
increase was the norm, many borrowers began to view their home 
as an investment, borrowing recklessly based on a plan to refinance 
when their monthly payments increased.30  Many renters were 
desperate to realize their own “American Dream of 
Homeownership”;31 and many of those who already owned homes 
were in a frenzy to either upgrade to a larger, more luxurious 
“McMansion”32 or buy a second home as an investment property.33 
To capitalize on this opportunity, lenders further ignored the 
risks by substantially relaxing payment requirements and using 
minimal standards to verify income and assets.34  Compounding the 
financial risk was the fact that many consumers already had 
 
buyers who had been renting during the boom and entirely missed the rapid 
increase in property values that homeowners experienced.  See generally id. at 400 
(“[H]ousing price appreciation ultimately created a significant unaffordability 
problem for renters who wanted to purchase homes.”). 
 27. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 25, at 1 (“[L]enders offered essentially 
two mortgage products: fully amortizing, fixed rate and adjustable rate 
mortgages.”). 
 28. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Mortgages: More Choices, New Risk for Borrowers, 
FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, Summer 2005, at 2, 2 http://www.fdic.gov/consumers
/consumer/news/cnsum05/summer_05_bw.pdf (“[M]any new loan products are 
being widely offered that could benefit some people but be huge mistakes for 
others.”). 
 29. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 400. 
 30. See Larry Rohter & Edmund L. Andrews, McCain Rejects Broad U.S. Aid on 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/26/us/politics/26mortgage.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (quoting Senator 
McCain stating that “[s]ome Americans bought homes they couldn’t afford, 
betting that rising prices would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable 
rates”) 
 31. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 408. 
 32. See Christopher Solomon, The Swelling McMansion Backlash, MSN REAL 
EST., http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107733 (“The 
average American home swelled from 983 square feet in 1950 to 2,349 square feet 
in 2004—a 140% increase in size.”). 
 33. See Nicole Gelinas, Sheltering Speculation, CITY J., Oct. 29, 2008, 
http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon1029ng.html.  During 2006, twenty-two 
percent of homes were purchased for investment purposes.  Les Christie, Homes: 
Big Drop in Speculation, CNN MONEY, Apr. 30, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007
/04/30/real_estate/speculators_fleeing_housing_markets/index.htm. 
 34. See Harvey, supra note 2.  Lenders partly protected themselves from 
increased risk by charging consumers higher interest rates.  Id. 
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significant consumer debt with minimal savings set aside as an 
emergency fund.35  Worst of all, shady lenders took advantage of 
the housing frenzy and began promoting a variety of predatory 
lending schemes.36 
Eventually, the risks became too great and borrowers began 
defaulting.37  As the number of foreclosed homes started to rise, 
property values quickly dropped, reducing or eliminating the home 
equity many borrowers required in their plan to refinance.38  
Further complicated by lenders no longer willing to take the same 
risks they had during the housing boom,39 coupled with the 
aforementioned lack of consumer savings, 2008 foreclosure rates in 
the United States hit record levels.40  The financial losses quickly 
spread to the rest of the economy and eventually morphed into a 
national financial crisis.41 
 
 35. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 410 (“[C]onsumer debt has grown 
exponentially since 1976.”); Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Finally Start Saving, 
Aggravating Nation’s Economic Woes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120525879656021.html (stating that during 
the last decade many Americans had a negative savings rate—spending more than 
they earned—and that economists now expect the savings rate to rebound to three 
percent to five percent or higher). 
 36. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043–44 (2007) (defining 
predatory lending as “a syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage brokers, 
lenders, and securitizers to the serious detriment of borrowers”).  In states with 
weak anti-predatory lending laws, the screening process is often “minimal or 
nonexistent.”  Id. at 2041. 
 37. For a discussion of some of the risks taken by national banks, see Levitin, 
supra note 4, at 1009. 
 38. See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413; FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 25, at 
9–12. 
 39. See generally Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414 (indicating that it became 
harder to refinance or borrow once home values began to drop). 
 40. Id. at 412.  By 2008, nearly one in ten mortgages was either past due or in 
foreclosure.  Id. 
 41. See id. at 415–16 (noting that the housing crisis had a “catastrophic effect” 
on the entire financial industry).  President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed the 
housing market as the “wheel within the wheel to move the whole economic 
engine.”  Matthew D. Ekins, Large-Scale Disasters Attacking the American Dream: How to 
Protect and Empower Homeowners and Lenders, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 351, 366 
(2008).  See also Gjerstad & Smith, supra note 5, at A15 (“[A] financial crisis that 
originates in consumer debt, especially consumer debt concentrated at the low 
end of the wealth and income distribution, can be transmitted quickly and 
forcefully into the financial system.”). 
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B. A Brief History of Foreclosures 
The common law principles applicable to mortgages 
developed in England in the fourteenth century.42  Initially, the 
mortgagor was treated especially harshly.  For example, if a 
mortgagor failed to make a required payment on its due date, the 
property often reverted to the mortgagee, causing the mortgagor to 
lose all equity in the property.43  This is known as strict foreclosure 
and is almost never used today.44  To prevent inequitable results, 
most modern foreclosures involve a public sale of the property.45  
These sales may be initiated by either judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure in accordance with a state-specific statute.46  A judicial 
foreclosure may be initiated in virtually every state and in twenty-
two states is the only method.47  Minnesota is among the twenty-
eight states that also allow nonjudicial foreclosure.48 
Although either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceedings are allowed in Minnesota, nonjudicial foreclosure, 
normally called foreclosure by advertisement, is the preferred 
method.49  Foreclosure by advertisement is a process by which, 
 
 42. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES §§ 2–3 (1934). 
 43. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 544 (6th ed. 2006). 
 44. Id.; see also Gregory R. Henrikson, Perfecting Oregon’s Land Sale Contract: 
Beyond Notice and Cure, 76 OR. L. REV. 945, 961 (1997) (“Nationally, strict 
foreclosure was already rare by 1929.”). 
 45. DUKEMINIER, supra note 43, at 544.  Strict foreclosure is now prohibited in 
all states except Illinois, Vermont, and Connecticut, and only then under certain 
limited circumstances.  GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE 
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 584 (7th ed. 2006); Debra Pogrund Stark, 
Facing The Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a 
Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 647 (1997). 
 46. Stark, supra note 45, at 643. 
 47. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 12 n.6, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-397) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief]. 
 48. Id.  Minnesota Statutes section 580.01 also specifies that nonjudicial 
foreclosure is only authorized when the mortgage contains a “power of sale” 
provision.  See also Backus v. Burke, 48 Minn. 260, 267, 51 N.W. 284, 285 (1892) 
(“The authority conferred upon a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by 
advertisement is that found in the power of sale, as that power appears in the 
instrument itself . . . .”). 
 49. See Soufal v. Griffith, 159 Minn. 252, 256, 198 N.W. 807, 809 (1924) 
(noting that foreclosure by advertisement was “devised to avoid the delay and 
expense of judicial proceedings”) (internal quotations omitted).  Amber Hawkins 
also stated the following: 
Judicial foreclosure is expensive and time consuming for the lenders 
because they have to file a lawsuit and get a court order allowing them to 
take the property, which is why the lenders almost always choose to 
foreclose by advertisement.  However, one benefit of judicial foreclosure 
7
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“according to the mortgage instrument and a state statute, the 
mortgaged property is sold at a nonjudicial public sale by a public 
official . . . without the stringent notice requirements, procedural 
burdens, or delays of a judicial foreclosure.”50  The original 
Minnesota foreclosure by advertisement statutes were enacted in 
1849, the same year Minnesota was established as a territory.51  
Comparing these statutes with the modern statutes reveals that very 
little has changed over the past 160 years.52 
To be in compliance with the foreclosure by advertisement 
statute, the following are required: (1) the mortgagor must first 
have defaulted on his payment (or have satisfied another condition 
giving the mortgagee the power to sell); (2) there must not be any 
pending judicial proceeding concerning the mortgage; and (3) the 
mortgage, and all assignments thereof, must have been recorded in 
the county recorder’s office.53  Additionally, a notice of foreclosure 
must be served upon the occupant of the premises and published 
in the newspaper for at least six consecutive weeks prior to the 
sheriff’s sale.54  All foreclosure sales must be conducted by the 
county sheriff or the sheriff’s deputy, who will issue a “Sheriff’s 
Certificate of Sale,” which must be recorded by the purchaser 
within twenty days of the sale.55  After the sale, the mortgagor who 
was foreclosed on is granted a statutory period in which he may pay 
 
is that it provides a forum where the borrower can ask questions, request 
information about their loan, and assert any defenses they may have to 
the foreclosure. 
Interview with Amber Hawkins, Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Soc’y of Minneapolis, in 
Minneapolis, Minn. (July 21, 2010).  See also Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 12 
(stating that foreclosure by advertisement deprives the homeowner of a judicial 
forum to raise Truth in Lending Act (TILA) defenses, or to challenge the process 
in which their home is being foreclosed). 
 50. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009). 
 51. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 63, §§ 41, 42, 1849 Minn. Laws 139–40. 
 52. Compare id., with MINN. STAT. §§ 580.02, .04 (2008). 
 53. MINN. STAT § 580.02. 
 54. Id. §§ 580.03–.04.  Furthermore, because foreclosure by advertisement is a 
statutory creation, failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements 
renders the foreclosure void.  Moore v. Carlson, 112 Minn. 433, 434, 128 N.W. 578, 
579 (1910). 
 55. MINN. STAT. §§ 580.06, .12.  One criticism of the foreclosure process is 
that when the lender purchases the foreclosed home they can obtain an unfair 
double recovery by bidding less than the debt due and then reselling the property 
within one year for more than they bid.  Stark, supra note 45, at 665.  However, 
one empirical study during the last decade shows that this inequity occurs only two 
percent of the time.  Id.  In reality, lenders rarely make any true profit upon resale, 
and in most cases suffer a loss.  Id. at 664–68. 
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off the amount necessary to redeem the property.56  Typically this 
period is six months from the date of sale; but it may be up to a 
year in situations where a longer period is needed for agricultural 
reasons or the mortgagor has satisfied more than one-third of the 
original principle balance.57  The mortgagor may tender the 
amount due for redemption to either the foreclosure purchaser or 
the sheriff on behalf of the foreclosure purchaser.58  If the 
mortgagor does not tender the amount due within the statutory 
redemption period, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale acts as a 
conveyance of the property to the foreclosure purchaser.59 
C. Development of the Electronic Registration Concept 
 After generating a loan, the originating lender often sells the 
loan on the secondary market to government-sponsored entities 
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).60  
Alternatively, the originator may assign the loan to an affiliated 
trust or sell the loan to a loan aggregator or wholesale lender.61  
After being sold or assigned, the individual loan is often pooled 
together with hundreds of other loans.62  If purchased by an entity 
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they are issued as publicly 





 56. MINN. STAT. § 580.23. 
 57. Id.  When it is established that the property has been abandoned, the 
redemption period may be reduced to five weeks.  Id. § 582.032. 
 58. Id. § 580.24. 
 59. Id. § 580.12. 
 60. Hashop v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 171 F.R.D. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 
1997).  The primary market is where the originating financial institution creates 
the mortgage loan to the borrower.  Id.  Often this is done via a third-party 
salesperson known as a mortgage broker.  Mortgage brokers are typically paid a 
fee of between one and three percent of the loan value.  James R. Hagerty, 
Mortgage Brokers: Friends or Foes?, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, available at  
http://finance.yahoo.com/loans/article/103075/mortage–brokers-friends-or-foes. 
 61. Engel & McCoy, supra note 36, at 2045; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory 
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2209–10 (2007). 
 62. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2209. 
 63. See About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index
?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Sept. 17, 2010); see also Our Business, FREDDIE 
MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_business/ 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (stating how the process of securitization works). 
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If held in an affiliated trust or sold to an intermediary party, 
the mortgage pool is typically sold to a Wall Street investment firm 
known as an “issuer/depositor.”64  The issuer/depositor then 
assigns the mortgage pool to a trust, and the trust issues mortgage-
backed bond certificates to third-party investors with beneficiary 
interests in the trust.65  The trust (which technically still owns the 
loans) guarantees the third-party investors the return of the loan 
principle plus a portion of the interest payments over the life of 
each loan.66  The issuer/depositor and the loan servicer67 also 
receive a portion of the interest payments.68  Over the life of a 
mortgage, it is common for the loan to be bought and sold several 
times.69  This type of financing is essential to the American 
mortgage industry in order to free the capital necessary for the 
continuing creation of additional loans.70 
Traditionally, each time a mortgage was sold, the security 
instrument would be recorded in the public land records.71  
However, as the secondary mortgage industry became an 
increasingly common player, the recordation requirements created 
a rising tide of paper that began to stifle loan productivity.72  Loans 
 
 64. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 5. 
 65. Id. at 6; accord Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210.  Government-sponsored entities 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also issue mortgage-backed securities.  
Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010). 
 66. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210. 
 67. A loan servicer is a company that secondary market purchasers hire “to 
handle payment processing, tax and insurance escrows, foreclosure and other 
matters related to the loan or the property.”  Arnold, supra note 10, at 34.  In many 
cases, the servicer is the loan originator.  Id. (noting that a servicing contract does 
not represent an interest in the land and thus does not appear in the public land 
records). 
 68. Hashop, 171 F.R.D. at 210. 
 69. Affidavit of William C. Hultman ¶ 9, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2009) 
[hereinafter Affidavit of Hultman] (Hultman is the Senior Vice President of 
MERSCORP, discussed below).  A mortgage note by itself (as opposed to the 
combination of a mortgage note and a security instrument) is a negotiable 
instrument under U.C.C. section 3-203.  Arnold, supra note 10, at 34. 
 70. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“Home ownership in most other 
countries is far less attainable, largely because financing is not as readily 
available.”). 
 71. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 810–11. 
 72. See id. at 811; see also Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“[T]he sheer volume of 
transfers between servicing companies and the resulting need to record 
assignments caused a heavy drag on the secondary market.  The burden affected 
lenders, title companies, consumers and even local recorders.”). 
10
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often were traded several times before the first assignment was 
recorded, leaving the public land records out of date and “clogged 
with unnecessary assignments.”73  Many times these assignments 
were recorded in the wrong sequence, creating title problems.74 
In an effort to “streamline the lending process,”75 the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERSCORP) was created.76  
MERSCORP is a “nonstock corporation”77 currently managed by 
twenty-six shareholding financial institutions that are also its users.78  
With the cooperation of the Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America and several leading mortgage banking firms, including 
several government agencies, MERSCORP developed a secure 
computer database to electronically track mortgage assignments for 
the secondary mortgage industry.79  This database is known as the 
MERS System.80 
The MERS System is modeled after the Depository Trust 
Corporation (DTC), which has enabled securities markets to 
eliminate paper stock certificates to record the transfer of stocks, 
bonds, and other securities since the 1970s.81  Similarly, the 
 
 73. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34. 
 74. Id. (stating that error rates as high as thirty-three percent were common).  
See, e.g., Cocheo, supra note 12, at 48 (noting that prior to the MERS System, 
discussed below, the process of recording multiple assignments added up to a 
“massive paperwork challenge” such that, by one industry estimate, “it can cost as 
much as $250,000 to clean up assignment problems relating to a single block of 
2,500 loans”). 
 75.  This phrase is used by Carson Mullen.  See Carson Mullen, MERS: 
Tracking Loans Electronically, ALLBUSINESS (May 1, 2000), http://www.allbusiness.com
/finance/3594162-1.html. 
 76. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 33; see also MERS’s Brief and Addendum at 3, 
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. 
A08-397) [hereinafter MERS’s Brief] (stating that the severe title problems created 
during the savings and loan crisis were one of the main catalysts for the creation of 
MERS).  MERS was conceived in 1993 and incorporated in 1995, becoming fully 
operational in 1997.  See Arnold, supra note 10, at 33. 
 77. Arnold, supra note 10Error! Bookmark not defined., at 33. 
 78. Brandt, supra note 13.  MERSCORP is registered in Delaware and 
headquartered in Virginia.  Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211. 
 79. Arnold, supra note 10, at 33; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211. 
 80. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 2.  MERS members, including some 
3100 mortgage lenders and secondary market investors, pay the membership dues 
necessary to maintain this database.  See id.; Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211; see 
also Arnold, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]nnual membership fees currently range 
from $500 to $7,500, depending on a member’s size and types of business.”). 
 81. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35 (“[The DTC] revolutionized the way 
securities are traded.”); see also Mullen, supra note 75 (“The Depository Trust 
Corporation (DTC), of New York City, provided a good model.”). 
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creation of the MERS System reduces paper recording in the 
mortgage industry, greatly simplifying property chains of title.82 
The concept works by MERS acting as the “nominal mortgagee 
of record” for the MERS member/lender or secondary mortgage 
investor who actually owns the debt.83  In other words, MERS 
doesn’t own the debt obligation, but it keeps track of who does.  All 
the while, MERS is listed in the public land records as the party 
holding the security interest in the property, but only as a stand-in 
for the true owner of the debt.84 
MERS becomes the nominal mortgagee of record in one of 
two ways: (1) the borrower and lender designate MERS as the 
nominal mortgagee of record at the time the mortgage loan is 
originated, or (2) the mortgagee of record for an existing loan 
subsequently assigns the record to MERS.85  Ideally, MERS then 
remains mortgagee of record throughout the life of the loan.86  
When loans are transferred, an assignment of the promissory note 
is executed electronically within the MERS System, but the security 
instrument remains registered with MERS in the county recorder’s 
office.87  Considering that there are no means available to publicly 
record assignments of the promissory notes alone, the MERS 
System technically supplements the public land recording system.88  
As an additional benefit to vastly improving the accuracy of land 
records, the MERS System also significantly reduces the transaction 
 
 82. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35; see also id. at 33 (“Some have called MERS the 
most significant event for the mortgage industry since the formation of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.”). 
 83. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211; see also Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra 
note 9, at 806–7) (“Consistent with mortgage participations where a lead 
participant holds legal title on behalf of the other participants, and with secondary 
market transactions where mortgage servicers hold legal title on behalf of their 
investors, MERS will serve as mortgagee of record in a nominee capacity only.”).  
This eliminates the need to record each assignment of the promissory note.  
Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 806–7. 
 84. See Brandt, supra note 13. 
 85. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 5. 
 86. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34. 
 87. Id.  However, when changing loan servicers, the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA) requires both the old and new servicer to notify the 
homeowner in writing when loan servicing is traded.  12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006).  
These notifications are commonly called “hello/goodbye letters.”  Arnold, supra 
note 10, at 34. 
 88. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 9 (“MERS thus fills an information void 
that the county recorders and registrars of title cannot provide—the identity of the 
servicer of the mortgage loan, which is not required to be recorded in 
Minnesota.”). 
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costs and filing fees that had previously been associated with 
preparing and recording the security interest in the public land 
records each time the loan was sold.89 
Since its inception, MERS has grown substantially.  MERS now 
operates in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and is 
regularly accepted as nominal mortgagee of record by over 3000 
county clerks and county recorders throughout the United States, 
including all eighty-seven counties in Minnesota.90  Over the course 
of the last decade, MERS registration has grown very rapidly.91  
MERS is the current mortgagee on approximately sixty million 
mortgage loans,92 which represents roughly sixty percent of all 
newly originated mortgages nationwide.93  In Hennepin County, 
MERS is listed as the mortgagee of record “on at least half of all 
new mortgage filings.”94 
D. A Glitch in the System 
Although the MERS System was specifically “designed to 
operate within the existing legal framework in all U.S. 
jurisdictions,” defending the MERS concept has been a continuous 
uphill battle.95  The problem is that mortgage documentation in 
America is bifurcated into the promissory note and security 
 
 89. Joint Brief of Am. Land Title Ass’n et. al. as Amici Curiae for Defendant 
at 4–5, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 
2009) (No. 08-305) [hereinafter Amici for MERS]. 
 90. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 32; see also MERSCORP, Inc. v. 
Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 85 (N.Y. 2006) (affirming a ministerial duty ordering the 
county clerk to record and index instruments in which MERS is mortgagee of 
record). 
 91. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 2211 n.161 (stating that in 2001, the total 
number of loan registrations within the MERS System was less than just five 
percent of all loans nationwide; and in the following years, MERS experienced 
growth rates of nearly two-hundred percent).  The MERSCORP Website touts 
“[o]ur mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the 
MERS® System.”  About MERS, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about/index.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010). 
 92. Mike McIntire, Tracking Loans Through a Firm That Holds Millions, N.Y 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24
/business/24mers.html?_r=1&ref=mortgage_electronic_registration_systems_inc. 
 93. Karmela Lejarde, SunTrust Becomes Third Major Mortgage Provider in Recent 
Months to Require MERS® System, MERS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mersinc.org
/newsroom/press_details.aspx?id=235; see also Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491–92 (Minn. 2009). 
 94. Brandt, supra note 13 (paraphrasing comment by Mike Cunniff, the 
Hennepin County Recorder and Registrar of Titles). 
 95. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35. 
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instrument.96  Historically, these two parts could not be separated.97 
The MERS concept is based on two ideas: (1) every state 
permits a nominee to hold legal title in the public land records for 
another person, and (2) the “mortgage follows the note.”98  
Consequently, the rights to the security interest in the land will 
naturally follow each time a debt is assigned.99  However, quite 
possibly, using these two notions in conjunction was never 
contemplated.100  A leading treatise on mortgage law states the 
following: 
[S]ecurity is worthless in the hands of anyone except a 
person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it 
cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced. . . .  
[Separating the security interest from the debt] will leave 
one person with an unsecured debt and the other with a 
security instrument that cannot be enforced.101 
Thus, the modern day concept of the MERS System detracts from 
the authority of the common law rule. 
Minnesota real estate professionals foresaw this derogation as a 
potential roadblock to real estate transactions and banded together 
to find a common solution.102  The solution came in the form of 
 
 96. Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American Perspective, 15 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 35, 62 (2001) (noting that bifurcation derives from historic English 
traditions). 
 97. Affidavit of Ann Burkhart ¶ 3, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. 08-305) [hereinafter Affidavit of 
Burkhart]. 
 98. Arnold, supra note 10, at 34–35. 
 99. Id. at 34. 
 100. See Brandt, supra note 13.  MERS represents “an off-record system which 
the statute didn’t contemplate.”  Id.  (quoting Rick Little, the former Deputy 
Examiner of Titles for Hennepin County). 
 101. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, § 5.27; see also Affidavit of Burkhart, 
supra note 977 ¶ 3 (citing Nelson & Whitman in her assertion that mortgage 
bifurcation is a derogation to the common law).  But see MERS’s Brief, supra note 
76, at 32 (stating that despite the common law rule that a promissory note and 
security interest should not be separated, “[t]here is no requirement under 
Minnesota law that the mortgagee of record and the beneficial owner of the 
mortgage loan must be the same entity . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 102. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 13 (stating that “the real property 
section of the Minnesota State and County Bar Associations, the Registrar of Title 
for Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, and other Minnesota county recorders’ 
offices” worked together to address the MERS title problem).  See also Interview 
with Chuck Hoyum, Chief Underwriting Counsel, Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. 
Co., in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 20, 2010) (stating also that Minnesota is blessed 
in that, unlike many other states, the property law community here works 
particularly well together). 
14
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Minnesota Statutes section 507.413, commonly referred to as the 
“MERS statute,”103 which was intended to officially recognize MERS 
as a nominee of record.104  Specifically, the statute grants nominal 
mortgagees of record the authority to record assignments, 
satisfactions, releases, and powers of attorney to foreclose.105  The 
statute applies to all instruments executed, recorded, or filed 
before, on, or after August 1, 2004.106 
Just two years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard In re 
Sina,107 where a couple sought to void the foreclosure sale 
conducted by MERS for their home in Champlin, Minnesota.108  In 
December 2002, David and Candice Sina financed their new home 
with a mortgage originated by Maribella Mortgage, LLC 
(Maribella), and the mortgage was recorded in the Hennepin 
County land records with Maribella listed as the mortgagee of 
record.109  Subsequently, MERS was assigned as the nominal 
mortgagee of record and the debt was sold on the secondary 
market to Aurora Loan Services, Inc. (ALS).110  By June 2003, the 
Sinas had become delinquent on their mortgage payments.111  
Shortly thereafter, MERS initiated foreclosure by advertisement 





 103. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491 
(Minn. 2009). 
 104. See Act of Apr. 6, 2004, ch. 153, § 2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76–77 (codified 
at MINN. STAT. § 507.413 (2008)); Audio tape: Mortgage Satisfaction Certificates 
and Assignments or Releases, Hearing on S.F. 1621 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 
83rd Legislative Session (Feb. 10, 2004) (on file at the Minnesota Legislative 
Reference Library) [hereinafter Hearing on S.F. 1621]; Mortgage Satisfaction 
Certificates and Assignments or Releases: Hearing on H.F. 1805 Before the H. Civ. Law 
Comm., 2003–2004 Leg., 83rd Sess. (Minn. 2004) (statement of Chuck Parsons, at 
9:07; and statement of Rep. Thomas Pugh, at 13:10), audio available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/archivescomm.asp?comm=4&ls_year=83 
(follow “Listen Now” hyperlink under “Civil Law” and “Tuesday, February 3, 
2004”).  MERS was, however, referenced in connection with the statute.  Id. 
 105. MINN. STAT. § 507.413. 
 106. Id. 
 107. No. A06-200, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1094 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 
26, 2006). 
 108. Id. at *1–2. 
 109. Id. at *2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Believing that MERS had not complied with the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act,113 the Sinas brought an action in state 
court to void the foreclosure and vacate the sale.114  MERS removed 
the case to federal court, where the court granted summary 
judgment for MERS.115  The Sinas appealed to the Eighth Circuit, 
which affirmed the district court’s decision.116  The Sinas then 
amended their original complaint, again bringing the action in 
state court, alleging that MERS, acting as nominee for ALS, did not 
fulfill the foreclosure requirements necessitated by Minnesota state 
law.117  On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that 
MERS had standing to foreclose and met the statutory 
requirements of foreclosure by advertisement; affirming what each 
of the previous courts had determined.118 
It would seem that this case properly addressed the observed 
derogation, filling in with common law situations (such as 
foreclosure), that which was either ambiguous or omitted by the 
MERS statute.119  However, the plaintiffs’ expert witness in Jackson 
 
 113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(p) (2006). 
 114. In re Sina, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1094, at *7. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Sina v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 124 F. App’x 479 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 117. In re Sina, at *8. 
 118. Id. at *5–6.  The court also determined that even if MERS had violated 
state law, res judicata barred vacating the foreclosure sale because the Sinas’ 
amended claim arose from the same operative facts that had been the subject of 
previous litigation.  Id. at *7–8. 
 119. In re Sina was just one of many similar lawsuits that were filed across the 
country prior to Jackson.  The majority of jurisdictions favored MERS’s standing to 
foreclose as nominee of record, but unlike In re Sina and Jackson, many of the cases 
involved MERS’s authority to appear in court on behalf of the MERS members, 
not to foreclose by advertisement.  See Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
288 F. App’x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that MERS has standing to 
foreclose as nominee for lender); Morgera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 
2:09-cv-1476-MCE-GGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2037, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 
2010) (stating that the majority of courts have found that MERS has standing to 
foreclose as the nominee of the lender); Hilmon v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., No. 06-13055, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29578, at *8–9 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 
2007) (finding that MERS does not need to hold the note to foreclose and that 
borrower expressly gave MERS right to foreclose as nominee); In re Huggins, 357 
B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (finding that MERS had authority to conduct 
a foreclosure by power of sale under Massachusetts law); Mortg. Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, No. CV054003168S, 2006 Conn. LEXIS 1154, at *3 (Super. 
Ct. Apr. 20, 2006) (finding that “there is no question that [MERS] is the correct 
party to bring this [foreclosure] action”); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. 
Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the clear 
majority of cases support MERS’s standing to maintain mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153–54 
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noted that Sina is an unpublished decision, and is thus without 
precedential value.120  She also noted that the Sinas were not 
represented by legal counsel.121  Therefore, Sina only represented a 
temporary fix to any gaps not expressly covered by the MERS 
statute.  Given the high rate of foreclosures in the years that 
followed, it was only a matter of time before MERS’s ability to 
foreclose in Minnesota was challenged again.122 
 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a party seeking to foreclose need not be 
beneficial owner of the note); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 84 
(N.Y. 2006) (holding that the county clerk must accept the MERS assignments and 
discharges of mortgage for recording).  But see In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that without knowing the identity of the 
beneficial owner of the note, MERS lacked standing to obtain stay relief in court); 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 1, 5 
(Ark. 2009) (finding that MERS held no authority to act as an agent for 
foreclosure because they held no interest in the land); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. 
Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 179–80 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that MERS was not the 
true mortgagee but rather an agent of the true mortgagee because mortgage 
stated MERS was “solely” nominee); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb. 
Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784, 787–88 (Neb. 2005) (MERS does not 
acquire mortgage loans as defined under state law and, therefore, it is not subject 
to the requirements of the Act). 
 120. Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 7.  See also Vlahos v. R&I Constr. of 
Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004) (“[W]e pause here to 
stress that unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential.  The 
danger of miscitation is great because unpublished decisions rarely contain a full 
recitation of the facts.  Unpublished decisions should not be cited by the district 
courts as binding precedent.”) (citations omitted); State ex rel. Hatch v. Emp’rs 
Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“We remind courts 
that our unpublished opinions are [a]t best of persuasive value and are not 
controlling.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 121. Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 7.  Although the opinion indicates 
that David Sina represented himself pro se, In re Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 Minn. 
LEXIS 1094, at *1 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006), David Sina possesses a J.D. degree 
from William Mitchell and claims to have at least thirty years of experience in 
construction law.  See Dave Sina’s Biography, FIVE STAR LEGAL SERVICES, 
http://sinalegalservices.com/biography.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). 
 122. Not long after In re Sina, foreclosure rates in the United States hit record 
levels.  See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 396.  In the Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
metropolitan area, MERS was the mortgagee of record in approximately forty 
percent of all foreclosures.  See Brandt, supra note 13.  See also FISHBEIN & 
WOODALL, supra note 25, at 1 (“There has been a proliferation of new mortgage 
products in recent years.”); Michael Grover, Fed-Led Research Reveals Need For Better 
Twin Cities Foreclosure Data, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND, Sept. 2006, 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2200 
(“MERS-related loan volume is growing quickly.  When the researchers compared 
later records with the foreclosure sales records from 2002, the portion of 
foreclosure sale documents with MERS listed as the lender was much larger, with 
over one-third of the foreclosure sales in Hennepin County alone in 2005.”). 
17
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III. SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
A. Background 
In the barest sense, the plaintiffs in Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc.123 could be described as five individuals who 
collectively borrowed nearly one million dollars from various 
lenders and, for one reason or another, did not comply with their 
loan obligations.124  However, telling each plaintiff’s story not only 
better describes the background of this case, it also paints a clearer 
picture of what led America into the mess we found ourselves in 
just a few short years ago. 
Jewelean Jackson and her daughter lived in a house in North 
Minneapolis since 1991125 in what has long been regarded as a 
rough neighborhood.126  Early in 2004, Jackson’s home, which was 
in severe disrepair, was condemned by the City of Minneapolis.127  
Shortly thereafter, Jackson missed several mortgage payments and 
the property was sold at a foreclosure sale.128  At the time, she owed 
approximately $40,000 on the mortgage.129 
Sometime after the mortgage foreclosure sale, Jackson was 
approached by a real estate agent-investor who offered to help her 
keep the property.130  After Jackson accepted his help, the investor 
paid roughly $45,000 to redeem the property and arranged for the 
 
 123. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 
2009). 
 124. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 2. 
 125. Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 40, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter 
Complaint]; Affidavit of Jewelean Jackson in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Injunction ¶ 1, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Affidavit of Jackson]. 
 126. See, e.g., Minneapolis Police Dep’t, Fourth Precinct Other Tracked Offenses: January 
6, 2008–January 12, 2009, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/crime-statistics
/codefor/maps/572_Pct4_OtherC4Offenses.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) 
(depicting high crime activity in North Minneapolis); City Pages Staff, North Side 
Story: This Year the Murder Rate Has Doubled in North Minneapolis.  What’s Changed?  
Nothing, Really.  That’s the Trouble., CITY PAGES, Aug. 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.citypages.com/2004-08-25/news/north-side-story (“In June, the 
residential street erupted in violence.  An ice-cream man was shot during a 
botched robbery involving just $40.  Later that month, a teenager involved in gang 
activity was shot three times in the leg.”). 
 127. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 41. 
 128. Id. ¶ 42. 
 129. Id. ¶ 41. 
 130. Id. ¶ 43. 
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necessary repairs to the house to lift the condemnation order.131  
Jackson moved out while the repairs were in progress.132 
Early 2006, the investor informed Jackson that the repairs were 
complete and that it was time to compensate him for his services.133  
The investor arranged a meeting with a mortgage broker and 
guided Jackson through the loan application process, which 
resulted in her obligation to a thirty-year ARM with a principle 
balance of $229,500.134  The initial annual interest rate began at 
8.9% and after six months became adjustable to a maximum of 
15.9%.135  Additionally, the amortization schedule was based on a 
forty-five year term; thus, after making thirty years of payments 
Jackson would be required to make a balloon payment of 
approximately $160,000.136  For his services, the investor would have 
received a payoff of $215,317.137 
David Williams purchased his home in South Minneapolis, 
where he had lived and cared for his eighty-two-year-old uncle since 
1989.138  Williams, despite only being able to read at a fourth grade 
level,139 was employed and consistently paid his mortgage for twenty 
years.140  However, in 2006, Williams responded to an internet 
survey that promised him a free gift.141  Within hours of filling out 
the survey, Williams was contacted by a mortgage broker who 
offered to refinance his existing mortgage.142  Williams was told the 
new loan would be about the same interest rate as his current loan, 
and as an added bonus he could obtain some cash out.143  Needing 
money to make repairs on the home and pay off consumer debt, 
Williams agreed.144  As a result, Williams ended up with two new 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. ¶ 44. 
 134. Affidavit of Jackson, supra note 125, ¶¶ 2–3. 
 135. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 49. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45 (“Many of the repairs done to the home were shoddy and 
unprofessional.”). 
 138. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 86–87. 
 139. Affidavit of David Williams ¶ 3, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) 
[hereinafter Affidavit of Williams]. 
 140. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49.  Hawkins was the colead 
attorney for the plaintiffs. 
 141. Id. ¶ 4. 
 142. See id. ¶ 4. 
 143. Id. ¶ 7. 
 144. Id. ¶ 6. 
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mortgages: one for $192,000 and a junior mortgage for an 
additional $48,000.145  The first mortgage was a thirty-year ARM with 
an initial annual interest rate of 8.125%.146 
Like Jackson’s loan, the payments were based on a forty-five 
year amortization schedule.147  Thus, after thirty years Williams 
would still owe a balance of over $162,000.148  The junior mortgage 
was a thirty-year fixed at the rate of 11.125%, with payments based 
on a forty-year year amortization schedule.149  At the closing, 
Williams was presented with many documents that he could neither 
read nor understand.150  These documents and the terms of the 
mortgages were never correctly explained.151  Unable to keep up 
with the new payments, Williams’s home eventually went into 
foreclosure, and was purchased by MERS in November 2007.152 
Brenda Doane, a single mother of two, purchased her home in 
Richfield in 2004, where she was employed as a dental assistant.153  
Early in 2007, Doane lost her job.154  She searched for a new job to 
no avail, and within months she fell behind in her mortgage 
payments.155  Eventually, her home went into foreclosure and was 
sold to MERS in July 2007.156 
Ethylon and William Brown purchased their home in 
Southwest Minneapolis in 2007.157  Rather than selling their old 
home, the couple decided to keep their previous residence as an 
investment property.158  However, not long after their first renters 
moved in, they stopped paying rent.159  After evicting the renters, 
the property was vacant for several months.160  Eventually, the 
 
 145. See Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 96, 99 n.9. 
 146. Id. ¶ 96. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. ¶ 99 n.9. 
 150. Affidavit of Williams, supra note 139, ¶ 8. 
 151. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 93. 
 152. See id. ¶ 102. 
 153. Id. ¶ 70. 
 154. Affidavit of Brenda Doane ¶ 4, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 155. Id. ¶ 4; Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 77. 
 156. See Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 78, 83. 
 157. See id. ¶ 63. 
 158. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Ethylon B. 
Brown ¶ 5, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 159. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Brown, supra 
note 158, ¶ 6. 
 160. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Affidavit of Brown, supra 
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couple’s savings dried up and they missed several mortgage 
payments.161  Shortly after, both of their properties went into 
foreclosure, and the Browns’ new home was sold at a sheriff’s sale 
in February, 2008.162 
Thus, each plaintiff arrived at financial troubles in different 
ways.  However, each of their stories is shared by thousands of 
others,163 both in Minnesota and around the country.164  Whether by 
an equity-stripping scheme, shady lending practices, 
unemployment, or over-reliance on a booming housing market 
with too little cash savings, the common element among the 
plaintiffs was that their mortgages were held by MERS as a nominee 
of record.165  Moreover, following default, it was MERS that 
instituted the foreclosure by advertisement proceedings.166 
B. District Court 
Banding together in an effort to prevent losing their homes, 
the plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state court claiming that 
MERS violated Minnesota property law by foreclosing mortgages by 
advertisement without the proper recordation of all mortgage 
assignments.167  Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to restrain MERS 
from commencing any further nonjudicial foreclosures without 
first recording assignments and from evicting homeowners 
following the redemption period on MERS-initiated foreclosures.168  
MERS responded by removing the case to federal court.169  
Believing the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success at trial to be slight, 
 
note 158, ¶¶ 6–7. 
 161. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see Complaint, supra note 
125, ¶ 64. 
 162. Complaint, supra note 125, ¶¶ 65–66; Affidavit of Brown, supra note 158, 
¶¶ 7, 10. 
 163. See, e.g., Ford Fesseden, The American Dream Foreclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9A0CEFDE1038F937A25753C1A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
 164. See Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49; see also Prentiss Cox, 
Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688 (2008) (describing the scope and magnitude of the 
foreclosure crisis). 
 165. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10798, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 166. Id. at *7. 
 167. Id. at *1–2. 
 168. See id. at *2. 
 169. Id. at *1. 
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the district court denied a temporary injunction.170 
In contemplation of a permanent injunction, the court 
realized that the dispositive issue in the case concerned the 
interpretation of Minnesota state law.171  Furthermore, in addition 
to being novel and likely to reoccur, the court also recognized that 
the class action suit sought sweeping relief and had arrived in 
federal court solely on the basis of diversity rather than being a 
federal question.172  The district court therefore certified the 
following question for the Minnesota Supreme Court: 
Where an entity, such as defendant MERS, serves as 
mortgagee of record as nominee for a lender and that 
lender’s successors and assigns and there has been no 
assignment of the mortgage itself, is an assignment of the 
ownership of the underlying indebtedness for which the 
mortgage serves as security an assignment that must be 
recorded prior to the commencement of a mortgage 
foreclosure by advertisement under Minn. Stat. ch. 580?173 
C. Minnesota Supreme Court—the Majority Decision 
In answering this question, the court first looked to the 
foreclosure by advertisement statutes, ultimately determining that a 
phrase within the statute unambiguously distinguished a 
“mortgage” (i.e., the instrument used to secure a debt) as separate 
from the “debt” itself (represented by the promissory note).174  
Since, according to the statute, only recordation of the “mortgage” 
is required, MERS, as the continuous record holder of the security 
interest, was in full compliance.175 
 
 
The court next considered the effect of the traditional concept 
 
 170. See id. at *2, *4–12. 
 171. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14785, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2010) (“In a federal system, it is 
obviously desirable that questions of law which . . . are both intensely local and 
immensely important to a wide spectrum of state government activities be decided 
in the first instance by state courts.”) (quoting Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662 
n.16 (1978)). 
 172. Id. at *4. 
 173. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 489 
(Minn. 2009) (stating the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reformulation of the 
district court’s certified question). 
 174. Id. at 496; see MINN. STAT. §§ 580.02, .04 (2008). 
 175. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 496. 
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that “the mortgage follows the note.”176  In short, each time a 
promissory note is assigned, an equitable interest in the mortgage 
is created in the assignee.177  Thus, the question was whether this 
change in equitable interest of the mortgage required 
recordation.178  Case history indicated that the “manifest purpose” 
of the recording requirement was “to make the title to the 
mortgage [a] matter of record,” thus creating certainty of 
ownership;179 however, the requirement is not one of 
“supertechnical niceties and details of description.”180  Therefore, 
the court has never required the recording of equitable interests to 
be in compliance with the foreclosure by advertisement process.181 
Last, the plaintiffs contended that because MERS acted only as 
nominee for MERS members, they did not actually hold legal title 
to the mortgage.182  They claimed that legal title was actually held by 
the MERS member who was assigned the debt; thus, each time the 
debt was assigned, legal title transferred, which required 
recordation.183  But the court held that this argument also failed 
because it has been established that assignment of a debt did not 
affect legal title to the security interest.184  Therefore, the court 
found that MERS properly held both record and legal title to each 
of the plaintiff’s mortgages.185 
 
 
Finally, the court verified MERS’s authority to foreclose, 
stating that “the power of sale must be exercised in the name of the 
 
 176. Id. at 497; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Pope, 85 Minn. 433, 434, 89 N.W. 318, 
318 (1902); Affidavit of Burkhart, supra note 97, ¶ 3 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, § 5.27) (“The security [mortgage] is virtually 
inseparable from the obligation unless the parties to the transfer expressly agree 
to separate them.”). 
 177. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 497. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Mendenhall, 18 Minn. 232, 236 (1872)). 
 180. Id. at 498 (quoting Soufal v. Griffith, 159 Minn. 252, 255–56, 198 N.W. 
807, 808–9 (1924)). 
 181. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 498; see also Morrison, 18 Minn. at 237 (stating that a 
“mere equitable” interest does not require recordation to be in compliance with 
the statutes). 
 182. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 498. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 499 (“[I]t is possible for a party to hold legal title in the security 
instrument . . . without holding an interest in the promissory note.”); see also 
Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 42 N.W. 467 (1889) (holding that a promissory 
note did not affect legal title in the mortgage). 
 185. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 499. 
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party who has the legal title.”186  Accordingly, the certified question 
was answered in the negative.187 
D. The Dissent 
In his dissent, however, Justice Alan Page believed that MERS 
had not complied with the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.188  
The statutes state that foreclosure by advertisement is not available 
until “all assignments . . . have been recorded.”189  Thus, when the 
majority acknowledged that each transfer of debt also conferred an 
assignment of equitable interest in the mortgage,190 Justice Page 
concluded that, to be in compliance, this equitable interest must 
also be recorded.191 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. What About the MERS Statute? 
As mentioned previously,192 by passing the MERS statute, the 
legislature appears to have officially recognized MERS and 
expressly approved MERS’s authority to record mortgage 
instruments on behalf of its members.193  Ever since this 
amendment took effect, MERS has contended that because the 
Minnesota Legislature gave its blessing to the MERS concept, the 
statute naturally extended to foreclosure by advertisement 
proceedings.194  However, the plaintiffs referred to this perceived 
extension as a “sweeping exception to the requirements of the 
foreclosure by advertisement statute.”195  Ultimately, the court did 
not agree with the plaintiffs.196 
 
 186. Id. at 500 (quoting Burke v. Backus, 51 Minn. 174, 179, 53 N.W. 458, 459 
(1892)). 
 187. Id. at 503. 
 188. See id. (Page, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 580.02(3) (2008)). 
 190. Id. at 494. 
 191. See id.; see, e.g., Moore v. Carlson, 112 Minn. 433, 434, 128 N.W. 578, 579 
(1910) (stating that because foreclosure by advertisement is a statutory creation, 
the foreclosing party must “must show an exact and literal compliance with its 
terms”). 
 192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 193. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494. 
 194. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 18–19. 
 195. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 9, Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-397) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief]. 
 196. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495. 
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Most convincing is what is not in the legislative history of 
section 507.413.  There is no discussion of MERS’s right to 
foreclose by advertisement and very little indication that the 
legislature intended its blessing to extend beyond the authority of 
recording mortgage instruments.197  The plaintiffs contended that it 
is the legislature’s duty alone to determine whether or not the 
MERS statute also confers the right to foreclose.198 
The plaintiffs further contended that when the foreclosure by 
advertisement statutes were enacted, the legislature never intended 
to allow “an entity with as little interest as MERS to act as a straw 
man to hide the chain of assignments of a mortgage loan in 
foreclosure.”199  Construing section 507.413 to allow MERS the right 
to foreclose as nominal mortgagee would defeat the purpose of the 
foreclosure by advertisement statutes by allowing assignments of 
the mortgage to no longer be a part of the public record.200  The 
plaintiffs maintained that the legislature enacted the MERS statute 
as a recording act solely to grant MERS the authority to record.201  
Thus, plaintiffs argued, when a MERS member decided to initiate 
foreclosure proceedings, MERS had the ability to update the 
security instrument by tracing the chain of custody of the note and 
to file corresponding mortgage assignments in the county 
recording office to be in compliance with the foreclosure statutes.202 
 
MERS, however, contended that this logic gave way to 
inconsistent results.203  After all, MERS argued, if the requirement 
 
 197. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35–36; see Hearing on S.F. 1621, supra 
note 104.  This possibly is the case because when the bill was passed in 2004, 
property values were increasing rapidly and foreclosure rates were relatively low.  
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief, supra note 195, at 9 (“[The] legislature alone 
should determine whether the convenience and cost savings for MERS and its 
members justify such a fundamental change.”). 
 199. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 32.  To be clear, when legal title to the 
mortgage and note are separated, there is no method of recording besides the 
MERS System that determines who maintains the right to foreclose on the 
promissory note.  Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102 (“Only the security 
interest is recorded in the land recording office . . . not the note, and certainly not 
assignments of the note.”). 
 200. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35. 
 201. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495 (“[A] Recording Act creates no obligations; 
rather, it uses recording to resolve disputes between parties who have no 
contractual relationship, but who lay claim to the same title.”). 
 202. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 47, at 35. 
 203. MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 19. 
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to record assignments was to make transfers of the debt a matter of 
public record, then why shouldn’t the ninety-eight percent of 
mortgagors who honor their debt obligations have also benefited 
from this requirement?204  MERS stated that under the plaintiffs’ 
analysis, only those who failed to honor their debt obligations 
benefited from this interpretation of the MERS statute.205 
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the 
MERS statute represented the legislature’s approval of the MERS 
concept, but because the amendment was technically a recording 
statute and never specifically addressed foreclosure, the court 
refused MERS the authority to foreclose by advertisement.206 
B. Hiding Behind an Opaque Corporate Wall 
A common theme that seems to unite all of the plaintiffs 
among the different jurisdictions who have brought suits against 
MERS was their belief that MERS helped to facilitate the mortgage 
crisis.207  A number of lawyers and academics claimed that the 
MERS System served as nothing more than an “opaque corporate 
wall” hiding the true owner of the mortgage loan,208 that 
MERSCORP was simply a corporate-driven “profit-engine” for the 
mortgage industry,209 and that this wall provided an impenetrable 
shield for the wealthy investors who controlled the capital.210 
Academics also argued that plaintiffs in different jurisdiction 
can also claim that in the heyday of shady lending practices, thinly 
financed loan originators would be used as “disposable filter[s]” for 
Wall Street investment firms.211  The theory was that after a 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 495. 
 207. See Mark A. Cohen, Foreclosure Challenge is Rebuffed by Minnesota Supreme 
Court, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal
/legal-services-litigation/12687396-1.html (“The rapid and careless expansion of 
mortgage loan sales on the secondary market is a well recognized cause to the 
current financial meltdown . . . .”) (quoting Amber Hawkins). 
 208. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 61, at 2266.   
 209. Brief for South Brooklyn Legal Services et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellant at 46, MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 
179), available at http://4closurefraud.org/2010/06/09/amicus-brief-challenging-
mers-standing-to-foreclose [hereinafter Amici for Romaine]. 
 210. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 36, at 2041. 
 211. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 61, at 2275 (“If Wall Street firms use the 
tools of structured finance to knowingly or recklessly facilitate and profit from 
predatory lending, surely they are as responsible as the fly-by-night brokers, 
originators, and servicers they capitalize.”); see id. at 2273 (“The lending entities 
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predatory lender made a loan, the debt would quickly be sold via 
MERS to the lender’s financier on the secondary market.212  This 
practice would continue while claims against the predatory lender 
accumulated.213  When enough lawsuits mounted to make the 
scheme unprofitable, the lender would simply declare bankruptcy 
and close up shop.214  All the while, the bulk of the capital in this 
operation was held securely by an unknown party in the secondary 
market—with MERS serving as a shield.215 
In the dissent, Justice Page noted that being unable to identify 
who owns a debt also precludes a number of defenses under the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA).216  After the trial, the plaintiffs’ lead 
attorney, Amber Hawkins, stated that “[a]s a result of the court’s 
decision, an agent with no responsibility or authority related to the 
loan can foreclose upon a homeowner through an expedited non[-
]judicial process without identifying who it is working for.”217  She 
claimed that because the MERS concept was developed to avoid 
recording laws, the result is a private structure that conceals crucial 
information from the public.218  Defendants in New York also 
counterclaimed that a single corporation should not be allowed to 
privatize the nation’s land records without greater transparency 
 
are used like a disposable filter: absorbing and deflecting origination claims and 
defenses until those claims and defenses render the business structure 
unusable.”).  It should be noted that “[m]ost individual consumers bring their 
predatory lending claims not as plaintiffs, but as counterclaims in defense of 
foreclosure proceedings.”  Id. at 2267. 
 212. See id at 2273. 
 213. Id. at 2189. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id.; Brandt, supra note 13. 
 216. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 503–4 
(Minn. 2009) (Page, J., dissenting).  The TILA specifies that if certain disclosures 
are not made (e.g., incorrect calculation of finance charges or payment schedules) 
the loan may be rescinded for up to a period three years.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), 
(f) (2006).  Upon rescission, the loan principle must be paid back but the 
borrower is not responsible for any finance charges (i.e., like an interest free loan, 
all payments made up to that point are credited toward repayment of the 
principle).  See § 1635(b).  However, a rescission can only be made “against any 
assignee of the obligation.”  § 1641(c).  This defense does not affect the loan 
originator or servicer.  See id.  MERS noted that none of the plaintiffs were raising 
a TILA defense.  See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 36 (“It should be noted that 
Plaintiffs raise absolutely no defenses to the foreclosures they are seeking to stop, 
reverse, void, cancel, or delay.”). 
 217. See Cohen, supra note 207, at 1 (quoting Amber Hawkins). 
 218. See id.; see also Peterson, supra note 61, at 2266–67, 2280 (noting that 
homeowners can no longer turn to the land records to learn the identity of owner 
of their debt). 
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and significant government oversight.219 
Partly in response to the numerous MERS lawsuits raising this 
issue, the federal government recently passed the Helping Families 
Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which amended the TILA by 
requiring lenders to notify homeowners within thirty days when 
their loan is sold or transferred.220  Following this amendment, 
MERS announced its new InvestorID program, which is designed to 
automatically send a notice to borrowers when ownership of their 
loan changes.221 
In an effort to address predatory lending concerns, Minnesota 
Attorney General Lori Swanson pushed the legislature to make 
several amendments to state banking laws.222  Amber Hawkins, 
former Staff Attorney for the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, 
stated that “Minnesota’s new anti-predatory lending laws are now 
among the strongest in the country.”223  Unfortunately, these laws 
were not enacted in time to help the plaintiffs in Jackson. 
 
 219. See, e.g., Amici for Romaine, supra note 209, at 1 (“MERS is eroding the 
public databases of this nation and unjustly withholding critically important 
information from homeowners. . . .  [MERS is designed] without regard to its 
infringement of essential public and individual rights.”). 
 220. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49.  See also Helping Families 
Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the United States Code) (promulgating an effort 
to prevent mortgage foreclosures and enhance mortgage credit availability). 
 221. See Karmela Lejarde, MERS Response to New TILA Legislation Passed by 
Congress and the Obama Administration, MORTGAGEMAG NEWS (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.mortgagemag.com/news/2009/0601/1000010667070.htm.  On its 
website, MERS also offers the ServicerID function, which provides a number of 
ways to search for the servicing agent for loans registered with MERS.  See MERS® 
Servicer Identification System, MERS, https://www.mers-servicerid.org/sis/ (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2010).  Typically, the results display the names of the servicer and 
the investor, with contact information for both.  Id.  See also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act’s 
requirement of sending a “hello/goodbye letter” when changing loan servicers). 
 222. See MINN. STAT. §§ 58.13, .137, .161, .18 (2008).  The amendments protect 
borrowers by (1) creating a duty of agency between the borrower and mortgage 
broker, (2) preventing fraud on mortgage applications, and (3) requiring 
verification of a borrower’s ability to repay their obligation over the entire course 
of the loan, as opposed to just the first year.  See Drum Major Institute’s 
Marketplace of Ideas, Predatory Mortgage Lending with Lori Swanson (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.mortgagerefinancingref.com/predatory-mortgage-lending-with-lori-
swanson.html (online video recording of Minnesota Attorney General Lori 
Swanson speaking on Minnesota’s “successful predatory mortgage lending law”). 
 223. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49.  Minnesota has also 
amended the foreclosure by advertisement statutes by requiring that the 
foreclosing party provide a defaulting borrower with information on the 
availability of counseling prior to foreclosure.  See MINN. STAT. § 580.021 (2008). 
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When reading the plaintiffs’ affidavits, you can’t help but feel 
sorry for them, particularly Jewelean Jackson and David Williams.  
Both were taken advantage of through predatory lending 
schemes.224  However, the legal issue for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was solely to decide whether MERS was in compliance with 
the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.225  MERS considered the 
plaintiffs’ attempt to interject any connection between the MERS 
System and predatory lending as “unfounded and irrelevant to the 
legal question [the] Court must decide.”226  Ultimately, the court 
chose to narrow its focus to the issue of foreclosures, leaving the 
broader predatory lending issues for the legislature.227 
C. Tax Evasion or Efficient Business? 
Advocates of the MERS System often point out the substantial 
cost savings electronic recordation provide over the traditional 
method of recording a paper copy of the security instrument with 
the county recorder or registrar of titles each time the loan changes 
hands.228  Others claim that these “cost savings” really amount to a 
form of legalized tax evasion.229 
 
MERS currently charges a fee of $4.95 to register a loan on the 
MERS System.230  Once on the system, MERS members, who pay 
annual fees based on their size and trading volume, can transfer 
 
 224. See Affidavit of Jackson, supra note 125, at 1–2; Affidavit of Williams, supra 
note 139, at 1–2. 
 225. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 40–41. 
 226. Id. at 40.  The plaintiffs’ Amicus Brief also largely focused on racial 
discrimination.  See Brief for Myron Orfield et al. as Amici Curiae for Plaintiffs at 1, 
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10798 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008) (stating in the first two sentences that “housing 
discrimination did not end with the passage of the Fair Housing Act.  
Discrimination against racial minorities seeking to rent, buy, and insure houses 
continues to be an endemic problem across the United States.”). 
 227. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 502 
(Minn. 2009) (“[R]esolving these problems is beyond the scope of the issue before 
us and thus beyond our decision-making authority.”).  Robert Pratte, MERS’s 
attorney, stated that he respects the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts in trying to help 
the plaintiffs avoid foreclosure, but “this is not the way to do it.”  Cohen, supra 
note 207, at 1. 
 228. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 4–5; see also supra note 88 and 
accompanying text. 
 229. Peterson, supra note 61, at 2212. 
 230. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 10. 
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loans electronically to other members.231  By contrast, the filing fee 
for each mortgage assignment in Hennepin County is $46.232  
Depending on the number of transactions a company makes in a 
year, this difference can represent a significant cost savings per 
transaction.  One estimate claims MERS saves the mortgage 
industry $200 million a year.233 
Those who are opposed to MERS argue that the money the 
county recording offices charge is often used to fund a variety of 
other government functions, including court systems, legal aid 
organizations, and schools.234  With respect to how the loss 
indirectly harms the public, they consider the MERS System as a 
tool for tax evasion.235 
Advocates of MERS maintain that the public greatly benefits 
from this business innovation.236  Not only is lending capital more 
quickly freed up to create more loans,237 a portion of the cost 
savings is typically passed onto the borrower.238  The remaining 
portion of the savings benefits the millions of investors who have a 
direct interest in mortgage-backed securities and, to a lesser 
degree, nearly everyone else who maintains an interest-bearing 
account through indirect exposure.239 
The amici brief point out that, “without such benefits, it is 
unlikely that consumer-oriented government corporations and 
agencies—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and the Federal 
Housing Administration, and the Department of Veteran Affairs—
would have participated in the creation of MERS and served on the 
 
 231. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 34–35; see also MERS Pricing, MERS, 
https://www.mersinc.org/MersProducts/pricing.aspx?mpid=1 (last visited Sept. 
17, 2010). 
 232. Brandt, supra note 13. 
 233. Arnold, supra note 10, at 35. 
 234. Peterson, supra note 61, at 2212. 
 235. Id.  See also Diane Lim Rogers, Even Taxes on ‘Evil Corporations’ Will Affect 
Real People, SEEKING ALPHA (May 5, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/203090-
even-taxes-on-evil-corporations-will-affect-real-people (stating that ultimately the 
burden of evaded taxes falls on individual taxpayers). 
 236. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 812–13. 
 237. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 238. Affidavit of Hultman, supra note 69, ¶ 10. 
 239. Brett Arends, Should You Invest In Toxic Assets? WALL ST. J., Jul. 29, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB1000142405297020360920457431
6610509900476.html; see also Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 
33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the MERS System as a “commercially 
effective means of business”). 
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MERS steering committee.”240  Beyond the federal government, 
many state and county officials have also served on the MERS 
Advisory Council.241  Considering all this government support for 
MERS, as well as the benefits passed on to the public, the 
opposition’s highly theoretical argument that these cost savings 
amount to tax evasion appears to be broken from reality. 
D. The Implications of Ruling Against MERS 
MERS considered the plaintiffs’ suit “nothing less than a 
frontal attack” on the current methods to maintain land records 
used by Minnesota’s property law community.242  They claimed that 
the plaintiffs’ efforts to avoid or delay foreclosure were nothing 
more than an attempt to undercut the sanctity of the contracts they 
agreed to by avoiding the debt obligations they owed while 
remaining in their homes.243  According to MERS, not only would a 
ruling in favor of the plaintiffs require more expensive and 
inefficient foreclosure procedures, it would have also had a 
devastating impact on the ability of many Minnesotans to obtain 
future financing.244  MERS also argued that an affirmative answer to 
the certified question had the potential to cloud thousands of titles 
in Minnesota, further eroding the value of many properties and 
doing nothing to help the current economic crisis.245 
Justice Anderson stated that the majority affirmed the long-
standing principles that govern Minnesota real property law,246 a 
decision which is in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions 
 
 240. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 4. 
 241. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 36 (“Generally, county recorders have been 
far more supportive than some would believe.”).  Some believe the future of land 
recording offices lies in electronic recording systems.  Interview with Chuck 
Hoyum, supra note 102.  “Over the course of one generation we are likely to see 
some major changes in our current recording system.”  Id.  “One major change 
will likely be a push towards electronic recordation” but it will likely be one that is 
similar to the current grantor-grantee indexes now used, rather than one that is 
similar to MERS.  Id.  Some have expressed concerns about MERS destroying land 
records, others fear losing their jobs.  See Arnold, supra note 10, at 36 (“Some 
recorders have expressed concerns that MERS will eliminate their offices 
nationwide or destroy the public land records by breaking the chain of title.”). 
 242. MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 35. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 35–36. 
 245. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102. 
 246. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 500–501 
(Minn. 2009). 
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who have considered MERS’s authority to foreclose.247  The dissent, 
on the other hand, was left unconvinced that an “equitable 
assignment” required no recordation.248  Justice Page stated that if 
the assignment can be made in writing, according to plain 
language of the foreclosure by advertisement statutes, it must be 
recorded.249 
However, if taken literally, this interpretation of what must be 
recorded would require a wholesale transformation of Minnesota’s 
recording system.  Currently, there is no way to record anything 
other than legal title to the security instrument in the county 
recording offices.250  As Judge Schwartz from the Florida District 
Court of Appeals stated, “the problem arises from the difficulty of 
attempting to shoehorn a modern innovative instrument of 
commerce into nomenclature and legal categories which stem 
essentially from the medieval English land law.”251 
It is doubtful that an electronic database that tracks loans 
being bundled together and traded nationally could have been 
foreseen under the lamp light over 160 years ago when the 
 
 247. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  Since Jackson, several new 
cases have been tried; the majority of jurisdictions continue to favor MERS.  See 
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. CV 09-517-PHX-JAT, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 87997 (D. Ariz. Sep. 24, 2009) (dismissing claims made by three 
borrowers against a group of defendants that included MERS); Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys. v. Mosley, No. 93170, 2010 Ohio LEXIS 2380 (Ct. App. Jun. 24, 
2010) (finding MERS had standing to foreclose); Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, No. 
PC-2009-3888, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 110 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2009) (holding that MERS 
had the authority to foreclose as a nominee for the debts owner).  But see Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Chong, No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 127500, at *9 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) (stating that because MERS provided 
no evidence that it was the agent or nominee for the current owner of the 
beneficial interest in the note, it failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is a 
real party in interest with standing); In re Sheridan, No. 08-20381-TLM, 2009 
Bankr. LEXIS 552 (D. Idaho Mar. 12, 2009) (denying MERS standing in court 
because they failed to provide evidence of any interest in the note and deed of 
trust); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Johnston, No. 420-6-09 Rdcv, 2009 Vt. 
LEXIS 15 (Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2009) (dismissing MERS’s action to foreclose for 
lack of standing). 
 248. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 503 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102. 
 251. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007); see also MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 101 (N.Y. 2006) 
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part) (“It is the incongruity between the needs of the 
modern electronic secondary mortgage market and our venerable real property 
laws . . . that frames the issue before us.”). 
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foreclosure by advertisement statutes were enacted.252  The question 
then becomes: How is a court to determine the legislative intent 
when the issue falls outside of what reasonably could have been 
contemplated at the time the law was conceived? 
To resolve a dilemma such as this, the court must turn to the 
canons of construction.  In part, these statutes state that in 
ascertaining the intent of a statute, a court must “presume that the 
legislature intended to favor a public interest over a private 
interest.”253  Thus, when contemplating the certified question, the 
court likely weighed the effect of a decision either way, on both the 
plaintiffs and the public. 
The prevailing negative answer resulted in Jewelean Jackson, 
David Williams, and Brenda Doane losing the opportunity to 
challenge the foreclosure of their homes and to discover who 
owned the note at the time of foreclosure.254  Fortunately, Ethylon 
and William Brown were able to save their primary residence 
through a loan modification.255  This was a sad and unfortunate 
outcome, but it was also the lesser of two evils.  After all, had the 
court ruled against MERS, the delay in the plaintiffs’ foreclosures 
sooner or later still would have ended.  Eventually, MERS would 
have either traced the chain of custody of the debts and filed the 
corresponding mortgage assignments in the county recording 
office,256 initiated judicial foreclosure,257 or pursued and received 
the legislative blessing to foreclose what many argue section 
507.413—the MERS statute—was intended to confer.258 
Thus, in the end, more than likely, whichever course pursued 
after trial would have concluded with the same results; however, the 
cost to society would have been staggeringly high.  A ruling against 
MERS would have affected many more than just those in or soon 
facing foreclosure.  Because secondary market investors would be 
forced to bear the additional costs of preparing and recording old 
assignments prior to initiating foreclosure, the present value of 
 
 252. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10798, at *14 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 253. Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2006). 
 254. Interview with Amber Hawkins, supra note 49. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 257. Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 13. 
 258. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102. 
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mortgage loans would be substantially reduced.259  If the investment 
value of mortgage debt decreased, naturally fewer investors would 
be willing to purchase the debt from mortgage originators. 
Thus, ultimately the consequences of this decision would 
impact future borrowers by not only increasing the associated 
mortgage fees and title insurance costs,260 but also by severely 
limiting the availability of capital to generate new loans.261  
Therefore, it would be both more difficult and more costly to 
obtain a mortgage loan in Minnesota. 
Worse yet, an affirmative answer had the potential to cloud an 
enormous number of titles.262  If the court had ruled that MERS 
never actually held legal title or that the debt holder’s equitable 
interest somehow needed to be recorded, property owners who 
have satisfied their debts would be faced with the daunting task of 
first retracing the chain of custody of each debt that had been 
registered on the MERS System and then preparing and filing the 
corresponding mortgage assignments in the county recorder’s 
office.263  In the end, individual property owners would likely be 
stuck with the bill. 
Then, there are the even more troubling problems of what to 
do with properties purchased at foreclosure sales initiated by MERS 
or those acquired through bankruptcy proceedings.264  If it was 
deemed that MERS was never the proper mortgagee of title, all of 
the sales in which they were the seller or trustee are put in 
question. 
In a suit against MERS initiated in Florida’s circuit court in 
Miami-Dade, the Honorable Judge Jon Gordon stated, 
I am not certain what remedy, if any, these people would 
have were it to be determined that MERS was not ever the 
proper party notwithstanding that these folks might have 
been in default what their recourse, if any, would be.  I’m 
not certain with the satisfaction of mortgages that have 
been filed on behalf of MERS how good those are and I 
 
 259. See Amici for MERS, supra note 89, at 12–13. 
 260. Id. at 13; Cohen, supra note 207, at 2. 
 261. See MERS’s Brief, supra note 76, at 36–37. 
 262. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-305, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14785, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2008) (“[T]he premise of Plaintiffs’ 
claims threatens grave uncertainty with respect to establishment of chain of titles 
for releases and satisfactions of mortgages . . . .”). 
 263. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. 
 264. Interview with Chuck Hoyum, supra note 102. 
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am not certain how good title to property is that people 
bought at these foreclosure sales if it turns or becomes 
established that MERS was indeed not only not the right 
party but misrepresented by way of their pleadings and 
affidavits that they held something they didn’t own, so I’m 
not certain of the consequences but it seems vast.265 
With over sixty million mortgage loans registered on the MERS 
System nationwide,266 indeed the consequences would be vast. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the number of foreclosures in this country is 
staggeringly high, the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in 
their analysis of this decision.  There is no doubt that greed of the 
mortgage industry played a significant role in the current economic 
recession.  However, MERS, representing one of the most 
significant business innovations in the mortgage industry since the 
formation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is not the proper party 
to blame.  The correct parties to blame are the shady lenders and 
financiers who funded and originated the predatory loans that 
ultimately caused the subprime lending crisis.  MERS simply acts as 
a middleman for its members; unfortunately, on occasion, this may 
include dishonest individuals and companies. 
The MERS System represents significant change by developing 
the way transfers of interests in mortgage loans are tracked.  With 
any change as great as this, there are bound to be those who resist.  
New legal issues may surface that we have never addressed before.  
Many may attempt to take advantage of this new development by 
seeking results that would otherwise not be available.  These 
growing pains are to be expected.  This, however, does not mean 
that this new innovation is not an improvement over our historic 
land recording system or without benefit to the public. 
In Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had the power to severely limit MERS’s 
ability to foreclose on behalf of their members.  Fortunately, they 
realized such a decision would have come at a high price. 
 
 265. See Serving History, MERS: Litigation and Major Legal Decisions, available at 
http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/MERS::sub::Litigation_And_Major_Legal
_Decisions (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 266. McIntire, supra note 92. 
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